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THE SENILE MIND: PSYCHOLOGY AND OLD AGE IN THE 1930s AND 1940s
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In the 1930s, some psychologists began to study and discuss the normal and pathological
mental abilities of old age. This paper explores this research and its implications for an
emerging definition of old age in the 1930s and 1940s. The argument is that these psy-
chologists explained old age in terms of tests they had performed on children and young
adults. In addition, these professionals projected their culturally bound assumptions onto
their study of old age. In the process, psychologists helped to define old age as a problem
that required a professional solution. 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
In the 1930s in the United States, some psychologists began to study and comment on
older people’s mental capabilities. At a time when economic crisis promoted new attention
toward pension plans such as the Townsend scheme and Social Security (Amenta, Carruthers,
& Zylan, 1992; Graebner, 1980), old age seemed to become a problem in dire need of a
professional solution. Although physicians and scientists had studied old age in the nineteenth
century (Katz, 1996), there was unprecedented public acceptance of expert authority in this
area in the 1930s (Hirshbein, 2000a). This article explores the methods by which psycholo-
gists constructed their authority over old age, collected and interpreted data about mental
ability in advancing years, and had a lasting effect on professional approaches to old age.
The emergence of psychological authority over old age took place against a backdrop
of growing public concern about the increasing numbers of older people in the population.
In 1900, the United States population aged 65 or older was 3.1 million, or 4.1% of the total.
By 1930, the number of those 65 or older had more than doubled to 6.6 million, but was still
only 5.4% of the total population (Historical Statistics,1975, p. 15, figure A119-134). But
though the percentage of the population over 65 remained relatively small, commentators
became convinced that the rising number of older people, which they believed had become
possible through increased efficiency in living, translated into grave social and economic
problems. In 1930, two statisticians writing in theAmerican Mercurywarned that “we
must . . . squarely face the problem of how these older people, whom the efficiency experts
are now turning out, are to be provided for so that they can maintain their self-respect and
will not constitute a crushing burden upon the productive energies of younger people”
(Thompson & Whelpton, 1930, p. 393). Commentators at the time assumed that the rapidly
growing elderly population would begin to cause severe social and economic difficulties
if social scientists did not find ways to take care of the problem of old-age ill-health
and dependency.
A number of professional groups stepped forward in the 1930s and afterward to assist
in what was increasingly explained to be a crisis around the growing number of elderly people
in the population (Achenbaum, 1995). In the process, professionals in several disciplines
began to make diagnostic and therapeutic claims about a population of needy elderly people
and the social and economic problems caused by old age. As Andrew Abbott (1988) has








Base of textargued, groups become professions through their claims to abstract knowledge and their
competition with other groups for authority over specific areas. In the 1930s, a group of
psychologists made claims about their professional authority over old age by expanding their
existing authority over the mental abilities of younger people. In the process of expanding
their area of expert intervention, these psychologists constructed a problem-oriented picture
of aging, one that defined old age in terms of its diagnosis and treatment by professionals.
Although psychologists had noble intentions for wanting to further scientific knowledge and
aid society, many of their conclusions about older people’s mental abilities resulted in a view
of old age often characterized by disability.
G. STANLEY HALL , LILLIEN JANE MARTIN, AND OLD AGE PSYCHOLOGY IN THE1920S
As historian Dorothy Ross (1979, 1991) has described, psychology was one of the social
sciences to emerge in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in newly expanded
academic institutions such as University of Chicago and Johns Hopkins University. Also, as
John Burnham (1988) has pointed out, psychology became increasingly popular in the twen-
tieth century because it provided a way for people to examine themselves, and also because
industry and government could use testing for social control. While psychology grew as a
discipline within the university structures in the first few decades of the twentieth century, it
also expanded beyond academic environments and gained authority in the popular arena
through intelligence testing of school children (Chapman, 1981) and the Army intelligence
testing program during the European War (Kevles, 1968; Pastore, 1978; Samelson, 1977;
Sokal, 1987; von Mayrhauser, 1989).
Psychologists were active in expanding their professional territory by promoting their
mental tests. Further, they used language in ways that helped to augment their professional
authority. As historian JoAnne Brown (1993) has argued, psychologists in the late-nineteenth
and early-twentieth centuries employed metaphors of the successful professions of engineer-
ing and medicine to shore up their own professional claims. By the 1920s and 1930s, psy-
chologists were able to use the language of their own prior success, the study of childhood
psychology, to expand their arena of expertise to include people at the other end of life. But
in their use of metaphors of their past success with the psychology of childhood, psychologists
remained bound by the methods and assumptions that had governed their work with children.
In the process, these professionals structured a vision of old age inextricably tied to a vision
of childhood, one that was not necessarily complimentary to adults in the later years of life.
Two of the earliest psychological studies of old age took place within the personal
journeys of prominent psychologists in the 1920s. In 1922, the eminent psychologist G.
Stanley Hall (1844–1924) published his final large work, a substantial volume entitledSe-
nescence: The Last Half of Life(Cole, 1984). Hall, who was well known for his influential
1905 studyAdolescence(Ross, 1972), acknowledged in the introduction toSenescencethat
he turned to the study of old age both out of a desire to complete a psychology of the whole
life span and because he had been retired from Clark University and needed a project to fill
his unwanted leisure time. He began his study by surveying the existing literature on old age,
and then gathered advice from a multitude of physicians. He concluded that he was the best
expert on his own aging, mostly because of his advanced years, but also because of his years
of experience studying people. But though he considered himself an expert, he called for
further professional work to illuminate old age.
Hall used both the authority of people who had reached advanced age themselves and
the authority of psychologists to describe old age. First, Hall solicited the advice of a large








Base of textgroup of aging (largely elite) individuals, arguing that they were the true authorities on human
aging. At the same time, however, Hall used his own professional authority to set the terms
of the advice he solicited. Through interviews and questionnaires, Hall asked older people
about when they first began to experience old age, any unique experiences they might have
had because of their age, what society they most enjoyed, and their views on medical and
clerical authority on the topic of growing older (Hall, 1922, pp. 322–365). Hall’s questions
presumed that older people would have a unique perspective on the relationship between
growing older and the past, as well as a view on the present, religion, and death. Further,
Hall asked questions about health, illness, and physical capacity. Although physicians had
written about old age in the nineteenth century (Haber, 1983), Hall made it clear that he did
not believe that physicians had any particular knowledge about old age.
Hall’s approach to old age was fully integrated with his autobiography, and he ap-
proached his study of the later years of life by identifying himself as an aging person. While
his study of old age was based on personal experience, he believed that it would be useful to
other aging people to both experience old age and to prepare for it (1922, p. viii). Reviewers
of Hall’s book agreed thatSenescencewould be very helpful to those older individuals who
needed to adapt to their position in life (“Compensations of Old Age,” 1923). Hall portrayed
his expertise in terms of his years of life experience, and he intended his book to be at least
partly for an audience of concerned lay people. But like the professionals who followed him,
Hall used his expertise in psychology to set up definitions of old age and suggested their use
to his fellow professionals in psychology.
Like Hall, Lillien Jane Martin (1851–1943), a California child psychologist, also made
the personal and professional move from childhood psychology into the psychology of old
age (Bailey, 1994). Martin was retired from the Stanford Psychology Department when she
reached 65 in 1916, but continued to pursue her interests in child adjustment through the
1920 founding of her Child Guidance Clinic. Through her experiences in retirement, as well
as her prior studies with children, Martin decided that many problems in children’s devel-
opment stemmed from difficult grandparents at home who were not adjusting well to old age.
Martin (1931) argued that these old people needed to be salvaged by teaching them to adjust
to their new stage in life, the same way that some children needed help in adjusting to
adolescence. To further that end, Martin began an Old Age Guidance Center in San Francisco
in the late 1920s (Martin & de Gruchy, 1930).
Martin’s co-workers used Martin’s position as an older woman to attract potential clients
to the center. Clare de Gruchy, Martin’s chief assistant, reported that the appeal of a connec-
tion to another older person was enough to get older people to the center: “We explained to
them that we knew a person, herself seventy-seven years old, who wanted to know what other
old people thought about life—would they come and talk it over with her?” (Martin & de
Gruchy, 1930, p. 6). Newspaper and magazine reporters who interviewed Martin about her
Old Age Guidance Center emphasized her age, the fact that her work with older people was
a second career, and that she did not seem to slow down as she got older and even obtained
a driver’s license at the age of 75 (Fenton, 1939; Stern, 1930).
Popular press coverage of Martin illustrated that Martin, like Hall, derived at least some
of her authority from her own position as an older person. In addition, Martin argued that
one of the major problems encountered by older people in their adjustment to old age was
that they expected their families to listen to their wisdom and learn from their experiences.
Martin identified that expectation as unreasonable, and argued that older people’s grandchil-
dren would be more interested in the present than in the past. Martin’s description of appro-
priate adjustment in old age involved older people taking an active interest in youth and the








Base of textproblems of the present, rather than in their memories of the past. As an illustration of this
philosophy, Martin’s book onSalvaging Old Age(1930) contained a frontispiece with the
quote “Growing old is living in the past.” Although Martin was herself a member of the older
generation, she was decisive in her opinion that the older generation did not deserve vener-
ation just because of advanced age.
Although Martin’s approach toward old age relied on her authority as an older person,
she believed that old age could be approached in a scientific manner. For example, Martin
protested against older people being treated like dependent children because their well-mean-
ing younger relatives did not understand old age. Martin protested the common practice of
families making assessments of their loved one’s abilities and instead advocated a professional
approach toward old age: “When we have arrived at the place of looking at old age as a
period of life rather than as a bodily condition, we shall give it the intelligent and careful
study that we have applied to other such periods, infancy, childhood, adolescence, etc., that
is, as a period with its own struggles, its aspirations and its accomplishments.” Although
Martin argued that the study of childhood should inspire a careful study of old age, she insisted
that old people should not be treated like children (Martin & de Gruchy, 1930, pp. 24–25).
Martin’s descriptions of old age combined her personal experiences with her professional
assessments about the later years of life. One of Martin’s underlying assumptions was that,
since she had made the transition into old age with ease, that others could be trained to do
likewise. In addition, Martin assumed that psychological study and intervention were nec-
essary to “salvage” old age.
PSYCHOLOGYRESEARCH INOLD AGE IN THE 1930S
G. Stanley Hall and Lillien Jane Martin spurred other psychologists to begin investiga-
tions on the psychological aspects of aging in the 1930s, although researchers after Hall and
Martin were never as frankly personal in their studies of the later stages of life. Other psy-
chologists were, however, just as indebted to their personal and professional past experiences
as they moved from the study of childhood to take on the study of old age. As several
historians have pointed out, professionals had a great deal of success in focusing on children
in the early twentieth century (Horn, 1989; Richardson, 1989; Tiffin, 1982). Psychologists
used their established authority from their research on children, as well as the lessons they
learned from children, to explain and shape their descriptions of old age.
As some psychologists explained their new interest in old age in the 1930s, they con-
nected childhood and young adulthood to old age in a psychology of the life span. As Walter
Miles remarked at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association in 1932:
Psychologists have exhibited great interest in the first two or two and a half decades of
life. In so far as human behavior has been carefully measured and check-measured,
attention has usually been directed to this segment of positive development. Infants,
children, adolescents, and young adults have been examined by the manifold techniques,
tests, and intensive experiments at our command wherever these could be applied to
children and youngsters who by reason of educational or other social grouping have
been under our jurisdiction. . . . Important as this work has been and now is, still it
leaves five or six decades of human adult life relatively untouched. Maturity, later ma-
turity, and senescence are still in the realm for folklore, anecdote, and personal impres-
sion. (Miles, 1933b, p. 101)
As psychologists saw childhood as the positive part of human development, they as-
sumed that old age was a time of decline. And, since they had already explored psychological








Base of textabilities of children, they argued that the later years required equally careful investigation.
Further, some psychologists insisted that old age studies should result in the same institutional
structure that had facilitated psychological studies of children (Cravens, 1985; Lawton,
1940b).
The psychology of old age that emerged in the 1930s was indebted to childhood psy-
chology in several ways. First, psychologists saw the life span as a symmetrical normal curve,
with increasing ability in childhood and equally decreasing ability in old age. Second, older
people were frequently compared to children in terms of their behavior. Finally, the same
tests and measurements that had been used to describe the psychology of children were
adopted, sometimes with little revision, to the study of old age. Although psychologists were
clearly interested in understanding old age, and even in helping older people, their assump-
tions about the symmetry of the life span affected their studies of mental capabilities in old
age.
It is not clear why psychologists were so insistent on seeing symmetry in human devel-
opment, with a rising curve of child development and a decline in old age, but psychology
researchers framed their studies in terms of this symmetry. George Lawton (1940a) explained
that old age and childhood were very similar in some ways, and that “a developmental sched-
ule and an involutional one, if sufficiently prolonged, would contain many identical factors”
(p. 27). Further, some psychologists observed that old people behaved like children. As E.
V. Cowdry (1940) argued, “There is no denying the fact that in some ways we become as
little children before we pass on. Little children prattle on and on and nobody pays much
attention” (p. 55). Psychologists encouraged each other to further discredit the words of older
people by emphasizing the ways in which older people’s narratives were circumstantial,
irrelevant, misguided, or even delusional. Old age and childhood were thus connected in
substance, as well as approach, and psychologists expected to see aspects of childhood return
as people aged.
The Stanford Later Maturity Studies, completed by the husband-and-wife team ofWalter
R. Miles and Catharine Cox Miles at Stanford, were typical of the explorations of old age in
the 1930s. Between 1930 and 1932, the Mileses collected a population of 1,600 people, 800
of each sex, in the age distribution of 6 to 95 years, and tested these individuals in half-hour
sessions to evaluate vision, perception, motor abilities, recall, comparison and judgment, and
imagination. These studies demonstrated, at least to the satisfaction of the principal investi-
gators, that there was significant decrease in ability over the life span, beginning after age
30, in perception, motor ability, learning ability, and imagination. According to their mea-
surements, average adults declined in mental age by 3.3 or 25 IQ points between the ages of
30 and 80 (C. C. Miles, 1931, 1933, 1934; W. R. Miles, 1931a, 1931b, 1931c, 1933a, 1933b;
Miles & Miles, 1932, 1934).
The Mileses and the other psychologists who began to measure the attributes of old age
used the same tools that had been used on children and young adults. For example, with only
minor changes, psychologists employed the Stanford–Binet intelligence test, the ArmyAlpha
test, and a number of other testing devices in their explorations of older people’s intelligence
(Samelson, 1977; Sokal, 1987). Many of these tests involved the element of speed, and
sometimesmanual dexterity, as essential measurements of intelligence. As thesepsychologists
began to use these tests on older individuals, they discovered that older people seemed to
show a significant decline in their mental abilities. In their conclusions based on those tests,
psychologists judged the population of older people on the assumption that childhood and
young adulthood were the times of greatest ability. Thus “normal” older people seemed
deficient when compared to young people. Psychologists used the fact that they were ex-








Base of textpanding the use of these tests to include older people to congratulate themselves that their
discipline was becoming more scientific (Gilbert, 1935; Rabin, 1942).
When psychologists used existing tests for their older subjects, they found that studies
on older adults were technically more difficult to manage than studies of children. Finding
subjects for study was harder since older people were not conveniently grouped together in
schools or other tightly regulated institutions. The Mileses gathered their subjects by going
through clubs and other social organizations that had older people as members. Other psy-
chologists studied older people in old age homes, while some enterprising researchers went
to children’s organizations such as the Girl Scouts to convince the children’s parents and
grandparents to participate in studies. As Jeanne Gilbert pointed out in her survey of research
methods, all of these techniques of selecting subjects were somewhat useful, although the
challenge remained to select a population that could be compared to a younger population of
equal original intelligence, since the goal was to test for changes in intelligence based solely
on age. While psychologists acknowledged that institutionalized older people were not the
same as those who were able to maintain their lives outside of institutions, they sometimes
made generalizations about old age from an institutionalized elderly population because it
was easy to locate subjects for study (Gilbert, 1935; Ruch, 1934a).
Researchers also ran into trouble gaining the cooperation of their subject population, a
problem that puzzled them when they recalled the ease with which children had been ex-
amined. Josephine Curtis Foster and Grace Taylor (1920) had early on approached the prob-
lem of studying older people, and they expressed surprise that they could not encourage an
older population the way they could do with a younger population:
The difficulty is that the common incentives such as praise, approval, etc., which are so
effective with children, are of little avail with the old. . . . Theyounger subjects are
almost invariably more alert and interested. Their experience is such that they fit more
naturally into the test situation. They appear more adaptable than the older ones. (p. 54)
The psychologists were used to dealing with children, and had developed techniques to gain
the cooperation of those children. When researchers used similar techniques on older people
with little effect, they concluded, perhaps too hastily, that older people were deficient in their
ability to learn.
Because of their work with children and in outlining childhood development, psychol-
ogists emphasized skills such as learning ability and speed of reaction in their measurements
of intelligence, even when they expanded their studies to include older people. Many psy-
chologists insisted that speed was an important factor in mental ability. W. R. Miles (1931a)
defended the association between speed and intelligence by arguing that mental testing had
established in general “results which show positive correlation between general reaction speed
and degree of accomplishment in achievement and intelligence tests” and also that timed
results from tests “serve as symptoms, as placement indices, as predictive bases, and as
indicators of intelligence” (pp. 377–378). The Mileses (1932) argued that although older
people would likely not do as well on tests that measured speed, this fact indicated that older
people declined in intelligence in their later years.
By the late 1930s, some psychologists began to point out that intelligence tests might
not measure older adult intelligence as accurately as they had measured the intelligence of
children (Lorge, 1936). Irving Lorge (1940) recalculated one study that had used the Army
Alpha test on a range of ages, observing that the test mixed power and speed intelligence. In
his recalculations (based on a correction factor for loss of speed with age), Lorge found that
mental ability did not decrease with increasing age. But although Lorge suggested that older








Base of textpeople might not deserve to be unfairly compared to younger people based on these tests, he
did not draw any significant conclusion about how this testing bias might affect the enterprise
of psychological testing of older people.
Although Lorge’s work questioned whether psychologists’ tests demonstrated declining
abilities in old age, most psychologists continued to assume that decline happened. Jeanne
Gilbert (1940), responding to Lorge’s paper, argued that the only way to know the definite
extent of decline would be through measurement of individuals through the years or through
the creation of age-specific standards for these tests. Although Gilbert appeared to accept
some of Lorge’s criticism, she suggested that speed might not be a useful element of the tests
but that efficiency could be quite important. She particularly advocated the use of the Babcock
Test of Mental Efficiency, a test that was originally designed to measure mental deterioration
in psychotic patients. The basis for this test was the assumption that people with a decline in
cognitive functioning would have an increasing mismatch between their new learning and
their earliest learned material. This mismatch could be used to measure the decline in learning
efficiency of new material. Gilbert still presumed that there would be decline in function in
old age, but shifted the discussion from speed to efficiency. Gilbert’s response was typical
for many psychologists in that she was sympathetic to the limitations of some of the testing
with regard to older people, but still maintained that older people suffered from deficiencies
in old age.
In 1939, David Wechsler published a new test that was supposed to solve some of the
problems of using the Stanford–Binet and Army Alpha tests on older adults (Fancher, 1985,
pp. 149–161). Wechsler argued that it was inappropriate to compare a young person’s score
to that of an older person. Instead, he developed standards that would allow a comparison
between an older person to his or her age cohort. But at the same time that Wechsler helped
psychologists avoid the problems of direct evaluation of older adults by the standards obtained
by young people, Wechsler also insisted that mental ability peaked in a person’s twenties or
early thirties and declined thereafter. Wechsler based his claims on older people’s decreased
ability on speed tests and the assimilation of new information, as well as the fact that brain
size declines with age (Wechsler, 1939, pp. 56–72).
Although psychologists sometimes agreed that older adults’ lower scores on psycholog-
ical tests could be affected by a bias toward speed, these psychologists insisted on using the
tests and persisted in asserting that mental ability declines with age. Even when some psy-
chologists acknowledged that it was not fair to test older people based on speed, they still
believed that older people’s apparently decreased ability to acquire new information wasmore
important to their intellectual function than any retained information. Psychologists also re-
jected some tests that might be biased in the other direction, such as vocabulary or knowledge
tests, because they did not believe that the intelligence of adults increases with age as a test
based on vocabulary might lead one to believe (Sorenson, 1933). By emphasizing the ability
to acquire new information, a characteristic that seemed essential to childhood development,
psychologists emphasized the decline in older people’s cognitive abilities above their greater
experience and knowledge (Miles, 1934).
OLD AGE, MEMORY, AND GENDER
Although psychologists had the intention of being scientific in their study of old age,
they were bound by assumptions based on their place in 1930s American society. These
professionals sometimes used what they saw as widely held beliefs to give them more au-
thority in this area. But psychologists were also limited by their beliefs about old age, par-
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Psychologists’ professional mission was not only to further scientific study and the devel-
opment of appropriate treatments, but also to convince academic centers, funding sources,
and the public that they were indeed the experts on mental capacity in old age.
At the time when most psychologists were beginning their work on old age, there was
a clear cultural relationship between advanced age and memory of the past. In the early part
of the century, these memories were celebrated as Americans valued the tradition of the
nineteenth century. In the decade after World War I, however, Americans were less confident
about the value of the past and instead many public commentators insisted on looking to the
future (Bodnar, 1992; Kammen, 1991). But though the value of older people’s memory of
the past had declined, popular understandings of old age connected advancing age to mem-
ories (Hirshbein, 2001).
Psychologists engaged on the topic of older people’s relationship to memory by arguing
that focus on the past was detrimental to older people’s success in the modern world. W. R.
Miles (1935b) remarked that continual remembrances of past events, a characteristic that once
a provided a useful service to society, now impeded older people’s adaptation:
Particularly in primitive groups the old necessarily serve in place of such more complex
social institutions as library, record office, or historical society. They are the keepers of
the seal of tradition. They know, or at least believe that they know, what happened in
past times, and some elements of this memory wisdom have survival value for the total
group. Without the slightest disparagement of the social values here involved we must
agree that in this respect they readily admit of overcapitalization. (p. 600)
Miles argued that society had sufficiently advanced to obviate the need for older people to
be record keepers. Since that was the case, their attempts to claim a role for their memories
seemed unnecessary if not an encumbrance.
Psychologists further argued that older people’s adjustment to the physical world of the
past made it difficult for them to live in the present. Psychologists formalized the idea, artic-
ulated in other arenas (Ogburn, 1933, pp. 122–166), that older people could not function in
a technologically sophisticated world because of the changes that had occurred since their
own childhood. Lawrence K. Frank (1943), who had started his career by studying children
(Cravens, 1985, pp. 439–453), observed that new technology was geared toward younger
people and that older people had limitations based on their upbringing:
To the older men and women, especially those who grew up in the simpler rural life of
a generation or two ago, [large-scale social, economic, and industrial changes] present
a bewildering array of new situations to which adjustments must be difficult. Even the
acceptance and use of modern conveniences may, because of their complexity and speed,
present very difficult situations, as we may see in the hesitation of older people to enter
moving stairways and elevators and their avoidance of the labor-saving gadgets with
which modern life is now equipped. (p. 35)
Frank emphasized that older people were not part of the modern world, a world that had been
designed for young people ready to adapt to new things.
Some psychologists viewed older people as politically, as well as technologically, out
of touch with the modern world. Floyd Ruch (1934b) set out to explore what he identified as
the common presumption that older people were politically conservative. He attempted to
correlate the ability to assimilate new knowledge with political ideas, and found that younger
adults (with more radical political ideas) were faster in learning new tasks and patterns than
conservative older adults. Ruch explained that old people were conservative because they








Base of textused their past experiences in order to evaluate current events and that conservatism was “a
part of the biological heritage of senescent man” (p. 337). In several studies, Ruch and others
(Moore, 1925; Overholser, 1941; Washburn, Kepler, McBroom, Prtichard, & Reimer, 1927)
tried to correlate two assumptions about old age: that older people were slower at assimilating
new knowledge and that they were politically conservative. Through these studies, psychol-
ogists suggested that conservatism made it difficult for older people to adapt to the modern
world.
Although some psychologists addressed the implications of older people’s memories of
the past, psychologists for the most part were interested in memory that could be produced
and measured in a laboratory setting. W. R. Miles used activities such as learning short mazes
and memorizing new telephone numbers to confirm that memory declined with age. Based
on the laboratory measurements of memory, older people were not known for their connection
to the past but rather their propensity to forget (Cameron, 1940; Gilbert, 1935; Lewis, 1940).
Miles concluded that “Measurements of the relative strength of memory and forgetfulness
may therefore tell us whois old” (W. R. Miles, 1933b, pp. 114–115). Thus not only did
psychologists claim that reminiscence was harmful, but also they emphasized older people’s
deficiencies in their capacity to remember.
Since older people were deficient in memory as defined by psychologists, some sought
explanations for this. One psychologist (Hamilton, 1942), suggested that old people forget
because of their “sense of inadequacy and a consequent withdrawal of attention from various
details of present external realities” (p. 466). This psychologist, echoing Lillien Martin, sug-
gested that better adjustment to life experiences would help older people remember. He further
advocated training older people to notice small details in their surroundings on a daily basis
and report them back to a therapist. Psychologists’ description of memory and learning de-
ficiencies of old age emphasized negative consequences of growing older. But at the same
time, these negative consequences could be translated into opportunities for potential profes-
sional intervention.
Although most of the time psychologists spoke of older people as one coherent group,
there were different assumptions about old age in women and men. In general, psychologists
presented a gendered version of old age, consistent with contemporary assumptions about
gender roles (Filene, 1986; Kimmel, 1996; Rothman, 1978), in which older women became
disabled in their family relations while older men became disabled for work. Psychologists
addressed issues of older women’s adjustment to old age by focusing on family concerns and
the ways in which older women interacted with their grown children and grandchildren. For
men, psychologists emphasized the consequences of withdrawing from the work place and
entering the home. According to psychologists, the challenge of femininity in old age was in
letting go of the primary homemaker role. The challenge of masculinity in old age was in
letting go of many of the daily activities that defined American men in the early twentieth
century.
Edrita Fried and Karl Stern (1948) investigated the family dynamics of older people and
found a variety of troubling conflicts. First, they identified older women’s attachment to their
families as pathological. As Fried and Stern described, this overly intense attachment was
characteristic of older women because they focused more time and attention on their families
than men and because these family relationships could sometimes become disordered. Psy-
chologists recognized the power struggle that could and often did ensue between different
generations of women who had been assured that their primary role was to manage the home.
These professionals clearly placed younger women’s domestic prerogative above older
women’s need to be active. The therapeutic intervention in this case entailed counseling aging








Base of textwomen to find other activities so as to stay out of the way of the primary homemaker (Randall,
1943).
Although psychologists’ discussions of women’s aging focused on issues of adjustment
in the home, the issue for men was work ability, or possible absence of ability, in old age.
One group in England found that men over 30 in industry did not perform as well on psy-
chological tests (which had been developed for boys ages 6–14) as men under 30. They
concluded that intellectual capability (and thus capability in work) steadily declined with age
to the point that a man of 80 was about as capable of abstract thought as a child of 8. These
authors proclaimed the importance of their findings to industry, with the caveat that psy-
chologists were the only ones expert enough to make the determination of who was or was
not an efficient worker (Foulds & Raven, 1948). In general, psychological testing suggested
that old men were not efficient or capable enough to contribute to the work force.
Although many psychologists concluded that older men were less able to perform effi-
ciently at work, these professionals did not make sweeping recommendations to retire men
after a certain age. Instead, psychologists emphasized the variability of work ability in men
of advancing years. Not surprisingly, psychologists claimed that this variability was best
addressed though individual psychological evaluation. The Mileses pointed out that, while
the speed, efficiency, learning, and intelligence curves showed decrement in later ages, this
was not absolute for every individual and in fact some individuals did better than some of
their younger counterparts. Throughout the Stanford studies, the Mileses argued that mental
age in older people was just as indeterminate as mental age in childhood. Therefore, just as
psychologists had demonstrated the need to psychologically determine mental age, they also
needed to expand their professional arena to evaluate mental age in older ages.
This jurisdiction over an individual worker’s ability was important to psychologists’
claims about their expertise. Psychologists argued that they were able to reliably inform
employers when older workers needed to retire for age. As George Lawton (1940a) argued,
decisions about efficiency and retirement needed to be founded on science, and “industrial
and sociological changes will have to be founded on expert opinion” (p. 29). While main-
taining that there were certain deficiencies inherent in aging men, psychologists also claimed
that individual differences meant that proper personnel management depended on professional
evaluation of aging men. Psychologists promoted themselves as either diagnosticians or as
advisors to industry on what to do with older employees (Gilbert, 1940; Lawton, 1943).
W. R. Miles in a 1933 speech (“Old Age . . . ,” 1933) suggested that early psycho-
logical intervention, as well as possibly continued schooling, might help preserve men’s
mental faculties as they got older and compensate for some of the physiological damage
accumulated by their bodies. Further, Miles argued that a man who continued to mentally
prepare himself earlier “does not need to fear the onset of genuine old age, with its great
decline in physical power and even the troubles of ill health. If he has stocked his mind when
he was in his mature years he can draw on this accumulated knowledge and experience and
still play a satisfying role as counselor to the new generation of young people.” At their best,
older men could, if they maintained themselves properly, act “as the counselors and advisors
of younger men who have speed and dexterity but lack the experience of long years.” At
worst, truly “Old are the men of 70 and 80 who had little or no interest beyond matters in
relation to which age brings marked physical decline.” Miles imagined a place for older male
workers, but insisted that they accept advice and counseling to become interested in other
people, rather than themselves. Old men could be useful for their experience, but psycholo-
gists defined the conditions under which such experience would be worthwhile to society.








Base of textW. R. Miles (1933a) further argued that psychological determination of mental age and
ability would help employers determine the appropriate age of retirement. He explained that
his researches had demonstrated that, while as a group 70-year-old men might be slower, one
70-year-old individual might be quite capable:
Age is usually one of the important factors which define physiological and psychological
efficiency. No machine can last forever; action necessarily means the reaction of wear
and tear. But as the data presented in this paper indicate, there are distinct andmeasurable
efficiency differences between individuals with chronological ages of about seventy
years, just as there are differences among people who are in their thirties and forties.
While older men in general were inefficient, Miles argued that it was important not to overlook
exceptions:
Some of our oldest people can turn out better work than the average man or woman in
early adulthood. The importance of this fact for industry and employment of all kinds
is obvious. If the best utilization of the best abilities of human beings is to be made,
there can be no old age retirement dead-line. The individual in his actual contribution,
not his age by the calendar, will eventually become our employment criterion. (1933c,
p. 552)
Since age was not an entirely reliable indicator for when men needed to retire, psychologists
were clearly needed to properly evaluate men of all ages for their employers.
CONCLUSION
A group of psychologists began in the 1930s and 1940s to describe old age as a time of
life marked by certain characteristics in all people. They found through their experiments
what they identified as common assumptions: that older people suffered from slowed reaction,
inability to learn new tasks, were emotionally, physically, and politically conservative, and
that their abilities were generally declining after around age 50. Further, they articulated the
losses in old age for women and men in the family and the work place. Yet at the same time
that these psychologists were painting a generally bleak picture of life after 50, they were
also claiming that not everyone was subject to the same psychological decline, and that there
were sometimes benefits to growing older (Lawton, 1947). In fact, the psychologists who
explored old age argued that mandatory retirement based on strict age criteria was not fair to
the number of individuals who maintained their abilities late in their lives. At the same time
that they helped to reify the idea of old age as a time of decline and loss, psychologists also
argued that professional expertise was necessary in order to maximize social efficiency
through individual assessment (Lawton, 1940b).
In some ways, these psychologists’ assumptions of professional authority revealed pos-
sibilities that might have been somewhat surprising. Dr. Lillien Martin showed that an older
woman could be both a professional and a leader in her field. Also, one group found that
older women tended to improve in their adjustment to old age if they returned to work:
One might expect such a change to be fraught with danger because latent trends of
competition and jealousy between the partners might be activated. This was not observed
in our cases. Rather, the improvement following this change appeared to be due to the
fact that the wife, because of the recognition she gained, grew in her husband’s esteem.
This and the economic dependence increased her self-confidence. (Fried & Stern, 1948,
p. 51)
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sizing what they lacked in comparison to younger men.
In the 1930s, when national discussions over old age pensions were quite heated (Ber-
kowitz & McQuaid, 1991; Lubove, 1968; Skocpol, 1992), psychologists argued that mental
well-being was just as important (if not more so) than financial well-being, and that a pension
was not an adequate way to address an older person’s problems. As George Lawton (1938a)
pointed out, “There is no group of persons whose mental welfare is more neglected than that
of old people. This neglect is world-wide. Even those countries who are reputedly the most
advanced in respect to social services generally think old age pensions a sufficient solution
of the problem” (p. 281). At the same time that political activists and social commentators
were working out pension scheme alternatives, psychologists were arguing that older people
required more than just money. Further, psychologists positioned themselves to be of maxi-
mum use during a time when the aging of the population was causing unprecedented changes
in society (Gilbert, 1936; Israeli, 1942; Lawton, 1938b, 1940c).
As physicians who began to specialize in geriatrics would do in the 1940s (Hirshbein,
2000b), some psychologists defined a subject population of older people based around the
need for and possibility of professional intervention. On the one hand, psychologists made
broad statements about the characteristics of old age and conducted psychological studies
based on their assumptions about older people. On the other hand, psychologists also allowed
exceptions from the disabilities of old age for those who properly utilized psychological
interventions. In both ways, psychologists in the 1930s and 1940s helped to further discus-
sions about the elderly in the United States. These professionals left a legacy of care and
attention to the problems of the elderly, as well as a number of unexplored assumptions that
may still complicate psychological assessment in old age.
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